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ABSTRACT
This article examines the methodological implications of the
societal perspective in cost-effectiveness analyses in which the
costs of health-care interventions are deﬁned as the sums of
direct and indirect costs. In the model of cost-effectiveness anal-
ysis in which the planner distributes patients among many treat-
ments for many illnesses, the deﬁnition requires that total
indirect costs be constrained, and the article proposes an iterative
computational procedure for choosing a constraint under the
assumption that the planner maintains a target trade-off rate
between losses of health beneﬁts and reductions in indirect costs.
In the more common model in which the planner decides which
of two treatments for one illness to provide to patients, the adop-
tion of a societal perspective introduces ambiguities into the wel-
fare properties of the decision rule, and in general the conclusion
that a treatment is cost-effective is valid only if switching or
assigning patients to the cost-effective treatment does not
increase the planner’s total direct costs.
Keywords: cost-effectiveness analysis, costs, economics,
methodology.
Indirect Costs and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
The standard models of cost-effectiveness analysis
(CEA) posit a public or private planner of some kind
that commands, or behaves as if it commands, ﬁxed
supplies of health-care resources with which it cares
for a community having certain health problems. In
Weinstein’s well-known dictum, “[t]he underlying
premise of cost-effectiveness analysis in health prob-
lems is that, for any given level of resources available,
the decision-maker wishes to maximize the aggregate
health beneﬁts conferred to its population of concern”
[1]. Health beneﬁts are commonly regarded as utilities
associated with states of health, so that the “aggregate
health beneﬁts” conferred on the planner’s community
is a health-related (Benthamite) social welfare func-
tion—the sum of health-related utilities over all indi-
viduals in the community. Thus, the premise that the
planner wishes to maximize this function subject to a
resource constraint is a behavioral axiom with roots in
economic welfare theory (e.g., [2]). In fact, suggested
further on, Weinstein’s premise does not quite ﬁt all of
the current models of CEA, but in each of them the
planner assigns patients to treatments for their health
problems in a way that either maximizes its commu-
nity’s total health beneﬁts subject to a cost constraint,
or else improves its community’s overall well-being
without necessarily maximizing it.
Although there seem to be no substantive deﬁni-
tions of what constitutes “directness” and “indirect-
ness” in the cost-related literature, the costs of
interventions in health-care problems are commonly
divided into two types, direct and indirect. It is gener-
ally agreed that direct costs are the opportunity costs
of formal health-care goods and services such as hos-
pital, physician, and nursing home care, drugs, and so
on, but there is less than full agreement about the
nature of the events and resource usage whose oppor-
tunity costs can be called indirect. The imputed value
of foregone labor product when patients’ labor serv-
ices become inefﬁcient or are withdrawn from produc-
tion on account of morbidity or premature mortality is
widely regarded as an indirect cost. But while most
authors classify the imputed value of unpaid caregiv-
ers’ labor (informal care, community care, or unpaid
caregivers’ time) as an indirect cost (e.g., [3–6]), a few
prefer to label it a direct cost (e.g., [7]). Patients’ “time
costs”—that is, the imputed money value of unpaid
household labor services and the purported money
value of the nonproductive leisure time that patients
give up during treatment and convalescence—have
also been deﬁned variously as direct and indirect costs
[5,8], although the claim that the utility of forgone lei-
sure activity can be monetized has not been generally
endorsed [9], and is almost certainly tenuous.
For example, there are least three different prob-
lems with the notion of patients’ time costs. First, the
claim that the utility of nonproductive leisure activities
has a money value contradicts the assumptions of
standard microeconomic theory. Even if one pays for a
pleasant recreational activity, the payment does not
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measure a quantity of utility. Second, if nonhealth-
related utility has a money value, it is reasonable to ask
why health-related utility does not also have a money
value, and that possibility is expressly precluded in
CEA. Third, the proponents of time costs price all
hours of leisure time forgone at the market wage rate
(e.g., [7]), and this in turn implies that the individual
would supply any number of hours of labor services up
to the maximum possible number at the market rate—
that is, it implies that the individual and market supply
functions of labor are inﬁnitely wage-elastic at the
going market rate.
Despite the grayish area that separates direct and
indirect costs, this article begins by proposing one
characteristic that distinguishes the two types of costs.
In particular, the productive resources whose costs are
ordinarily classiﬁed as direct are subject to observable,
well-deﬁned capacity constraints, but the resources
whose costs are ordinarily classiﬁed as indirect are not.
For example, the volume of formal health care that can
be produced for a community is constrained either by
the planner’s budget or by the physical quantities of
formal medical goods and services available for treat-
ing that community, but it makes no sense to think that
a similar capacity constraint can be deﬁned for the
quantities of goods and services lost to the community
when workers become sick or die and are unable to
work. Increasing the community’s supply of formal
health-care goods and services makes it possible to
increase health-beneﬁt production. Increasing the
quantity of other goods and services forgone because
of illness and death does not.
Because the community’s supply of informal care is
obviously not unbounded from above, at ﬁrst glance it
seems that the cost of unpaid caregiving labor does not
ﬁt the classiﬁcation proposed, but the point is not that
the quantity of this labor is limitless. Rather it is that in
virtually all real-world circumstances no meaningful
upper bound on the community’s supply of unpaid car-
egiving labor can be deﬁned or established, and there-
fore that the assumption of such a bound is not
sustainable in models of health-care planning. Con-
sider ﬁrst that the maximum quantity of unpaid car-
egiving labor is never directly observable—especially to
a cost-effectiveness analyst—and in general it can be
estimated only from survey data the reliability of which
is always disputable. Second, even if reliable estimates
of the maximum could be obtained, the care provided
by families is not usually transferable to members of
other families. That is, if a family is willing to provide
up to h hours per week of caregiving services to its own
members, but only up to h′ hours to a second family, up
to h″ hours to a third family, and so on, there exists no
single maximum number of hours of unpaid care that
the family or community is willing to supply under all
circumstances unless h = h′ = h″ = . . . And ﬁnally, even
if all unpaid care were transferable across families (and
voluntary organizations) it is by its nature unrespon-
sive to reimbursement incentives and the direct com-
mands of health-care planners. As a consequence, a
planner has no means of inducing or forcing the com-
munity to provide unpaid care up to the nominal max-
imum quantity, and, if it is only accidentally reachable
by the planner’s actions, the nominal maximum is irrel-
evant for health-care planning. These arguments seem
persuasive, but if there are empirical conditions in
which a well-deﬁned, observable capacity constraint on
the supply of unpaid caregiving labor can be shown,
there are no compelling reasons to segregate unpaid
labor from formal health-care inputs or to regard its
cost as indirect.
As these remarks imply, indirect costs are the costs
of illness-related resource losses and usage that are
borne by the community at large, and health economists
have long regarded them as proper costs of illnesses
(e.g., [10]). In the literature on CEA, it has also become
conventional to argue that indirect costs ought to be
recognized by health-care planners in choosing treat-
ments to be offered to or sanctioned for patients (e.g.,
[7,11,12]), and a planner who does account for these
costs is said to hold or maintain a societal perspective.
The standard means of incorporating indirect costs into
CEA is to deﬁne total illness costs as the sum of direct
and indirect costs (e.g., [13]), and this deﬁnitional
mechanism presumably captures the consequences of
the planner’s decisions on total illness-related resource
usage and resource losses over the community as a
whole. In effect, then, the planner that maintains a
societal perspective has the double obligation of caring
for patients and of controlling the economic impact of
illnesses on the community at large.
Although the appropriateness of imposing this two-
fold obligation on a planner can, perhaps, be chal-
lenged, in this article it is taken as given. Instead, it is
argued that introducing indirect costs into one of the
two basic models of CEA requires the planner to set a
constraint on these costs, that in general the constraint
forces a trade-off between indirect costs and the vol-
ume of the community’s total health beneﬁts, and that
a trade-off rate between indirect costs and health ben-
eﬁts having reasonable welfare implications can be
built into the model. But it is argued that introducing
indirect costs into the second basic model does not nec-
essarily yield meaningful welfare conclusions and that,
in fact, it tends to reduce the generality of judgments
that can be made about the cost-effectiveness of
interventions.
Hereafter, any kind of health problem and illness
and any kind of intervention in the problem will be
called a treatment. For simplicity, patients’ health well-
being (or utility or welfare) is taken to be measurable
as numbers of quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs),
although other meaningful quantiﬁers would do as
well. It is assumed that the indirect costs and QALY
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productivity of treatments are not inversely related
because otherwise the argument for entering indirect
costs into CEAs becomes less persuasive and may be
invalid altogether. If, for instance, the QALY produc-
tivity and indirect costs of treatments are inversely
related, the distribution of patients among treatments
that maximizes the health-care system’s total QALY
output, given its total direct costs, may also give a con-
strained minimum of total indirect costs, and in that
event a QALY-maximizing planner would choose the
same distribution of patients whether or not it recog-
nized indirect costs.
Last, as suggested, two fundamental kinds of mod-
els have been employed in CEAs. In the ﬁrst, here
called the many-illness, many-treatment model, there
are many illnesses to be cared for, possibly many alter-
native treatments for each illness, and the planner’s
mission is to assign all patients who have each illness
to one or more treatments or else not to treat them.
The second model, here called the one-illness, two-
treatment model, is the familiar set of assumptions and
decision rule in which the planner’s task is to assign
patients to one or both of two treatments for only one
illness. The second model generalizes to any number of
treatments for a single illness; but because it makes no
difference in this discussion, the number of treatment
alternatives to two is restricted. In each model, a cost-
effective treatment is one to which patients are
assigned according to the decision rules.
The Many-Illness, Many-Treatment Model
Although it has rarely been used in practice—one ver-
sion of it was employed in the design of the Oregon
Medicaid program during the late 1980s [14–16]—the
many-illness, many-treatment model is usually charac-
terized as the “league-table” or “prioritizing” form of
CEA. In it the planner assigns patients to treatments
for all illnesses to maximize the community’s total out-
put of QALYs subject to a total cost or budget
constraint [17–19]. Hence the model exactly ﬁts
Weinstein’s principle of CEA. Nevertheless, it is now
generally understood that the same model can be for-
mulated as a simple problem in linear or integer pro-
gramming [20–22]. So suppose there are I illnesses in
the planner’s community and Ji treatments for the i-th
illness. Assume that the planner can spend no more
than the money amount C on the total number of
treatments for all illnesses. Let cij be the cost per
patient of the j-th treatment for the i-th illness, and let
qij be the number of QALYs per patient produced by
the ij-th treatment. Let Ni be the number of patients
having the i-th illness, and let nij be the number of
patients—which  for  simplicity  is  assumed  hereafter
to be continuously variable—to whom the planner
provides  the  ij-th  treatment.  There  are  variations  in
the  way  that  the  programming  formulation  of  the
CEA  can  be  stated,  but  essentially  it  is  this:  choose
the nij,  j = 1,  2, . . . ,  Ji,  i = 1,  2, . . . ,  I,  to  maximize
 subject to I epidemiological constraints
and a cost constraint:  ,  i = 1,  2, . . . ,  I  and
.  A  solution  of  the  problem  is  conse-
quently a distribution of patients among treatments
that yields a cost-constrained maximum total QALY
output for the planner’s community.
The CEA is plainly sensible if C and the unit costs cij
are deﬁned as direct costs. But suppose instead that C
is redeﬁned as the sum of total direct and total indirect
costs and the cij are redeﬁned as the sums of direct and
indirect costs per treatment. Then ﬁrst of all, the pro-
gram must be revised to accommodate the resource
constraint on total direct costs because the planner can
never provide more formal treatment care than its
resource base or budget allows. But indirect costs can-
not be entered into the objective function without
changing the nature of the CEA model, and if total
indirect costs are not constrained, the solution of the
program is the same whether or not the planner rec-
ognizes indirect costs. Hence the assumption of a soci-
etal perspective will affect the assignment of patients to
treatments only if total indirect costs are constrained,
and this can be done either by setting a single con-
straint on total indirect costs or by setting separate
constraints on the components of these costs such as
the costs of lost productivity, informal care, etc.
Because it is the more obvious of the two alterna-
tives, consider placing a constraint on total indirect
costs. Then the constraint must be binding because
otherwise it has no effect on the solution of the pro-
gram when only total direct costs are constrained. But
if the constraint is binding, it constricts the space of
admissible nij deﬁned by the program when only total
direct costs are constrained, so that in general a bind-
ing constraint on total indirect costs forces a smaller
maximal Q than the planner could obtain by con-
straining total direct costs alone. In short, as soon as
indirect costs are introduced into the model, the plan-
ner faces a conﬂict between producing QALYs and
constraining total indirect costs, and except fortui-
tously the planner that adopts a societal perspective is
unlikely to produce as large a total output of QALYs as
the planner that does not.
Because there is no self-evident upper bound on
total indirect costs, the planner is free to set a con-
straint on these costs according to any principle it
chooses. But the rational planner will know in advance
of choosing the constraint that the more restrictive it
is, the larger is the total number of QALYs that its
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patients will be compelled to forego. Thus, the rational
planner will not set the constraint arbitrarily, but will
select it only after weighing the societal worth of losing
(gaining) QALYs in exchange for reducing (increasing)
the community’s total indirect costs. That is, the
rational planner will (or should) choose a socially
acceptable marginal trade-off rate between QALYs
and direct costs—the largest number of QALYs it will
give up for a given unit reduction in total indirect
costs—and set the upper bound on total indirect costs
to achieve that rate. Otherwise, constraining indirect
costs satisﬁes no particular welfare objective at all.
Although it requires some computational effort,
such a socially acceptable upper bound on total
indirect costs can, or can approximately, be obtained
by iteratively solving the dual of the primal linear
program revised to incorporate a constraint on total
indirect  costs.  The  revised  primal  program  is: choose
the  nij ≥ 0  to  maximize   subject  to
the  N + 2  constraints  ,  i = 1,  2, . . . ,  I;
;  ;  where  the  super-
scripts D and IN denote direct and indirect costs,
respectively. The dual program is: choose the I + 2
variables πi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , I, πD ≥ 0, πIN ≥ 0 that
minimize
subject to the  constraints
πi + cijDπD + cijINπIN ≥ qij, j = 1,2, . . . , Ji; i = 1,2, . . . , I
The  πi  are  the  shadow  prices  of  QALYs  with respect
to the patient population sizes Ni, and ∂(max Q)/
∂CD ≡ πD and ∂(max Q)/∂CIN ≡ πIN are the shadow
prices of QALYs with respect to total direct costs and
total indirect costs (e.g., [23,24]). The maximum
QALY output max Q is a concave, piecewise linear
function of the upper bound CIN on total indirect costs
(e.g., [23,25]), and on account of the concavity and
piecewise linearity of max Q in CIN, ∂(max Q)/
∂CIN ≡ πIN is a nonincreasing step function of CIN.
Notice that ∂(max Q)/∂CIN is the reciprocal of the
implicit marginal money price (= marginal cost) of
QALYs at the optimum. More to the point, though, it
is precisely the marginal trade-off rate between QALYs
and total indirect costs at the optimum. That is, given
CIN and assuming that the assignment of patients to
treatments remains optimal, πIN is the rate of loss
(gain) in total QALY output per marginal reduction
(increase) in CIN.
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Assume then that the planner preselects a socially
acceptable marginal trade-off rate between QALYs
and indirect costs, say , where by “socially accept-
able” is meant a rate deemed acceptable by the plan-
ner’s community and determined by a community
vote, community survey, or by some other method
that is irrelevant here. But having chosen , the
planner’s charge is to select a CIN that yields .
Obviously, the choice of CIN cannot be made a pri-
ori, but it can be made, or made approximately, by
iteratively solving the dual program. An algorithm
for selecting CIN is as follows if there exists a solu-
tion such that . (If no such solution exists,
the planner has no way of assigning patients to treat-
ments that achieves its welfare objectives.) First,
since πIN is an everywhere nonincreasing function of
CIN, with some care large and small values of CIN
can be chosen so that solutions of the dual program
give values of πIN that bracket . Let CIN,1 be the
smaller of the two initial upper bounds on total indi-
rect costs and CIN,2 be the larger of the two. Then
solutions of the dual program yield the shadow
prices πIN,1 and πIN,2, and . If either
of these last two inequalities is an equality, the algo-
rithm is terminated. Otherwise, the program is refor-
mulated and re-solved ﬁrst with a slightly larger
value of CIN than CIN,1, and next with a slightly
smaller value of CIN than CIN,2. Denote the two new
shadow prices by πIN,11 and πIN,22, respectively.
Accordingly, ; or ;
or . Thus, the bracketing algo-
rithm continues until a trial value of CIN yields
or until , where δ> 0 is prede-
termined by the planner.
The algorithm is laborious but workable. It has
been mentioned the planner may wish to set separate
constraints on the components of indirect costs, but
the algorithm cannot be used with multiple cost con-
straints because the shadow prices of QALYs with
respect to the upper bounds on the cost components
are functions of the upper bounds on all of the cost
components. In general, changing one of the bounds
changes all of the shadow prices, and there may not
even exist a set of upper bounds on the cost compo-
nents that yields the planner’s target shadow prices.
This suggests that the planning program should be for-
mulated with only two cost constraints, one on total
direct costs and one on total indirect costs.
The One-Illness, Two-Treatment Model
In what has been called the one-illness, two-treatment
model—it is also known as the cutoff-point or thresh-
old form of CEA—the planner must decide between
two medically substitutable treatments for illness i, ij,
and ik, to provide to or sanction for patients. The
model is commonly used in economic evaluations of
pˆIN
pˆIN
pˆIN
p pIN IN= ˆ
pˆIN
p p pIN,1 IN IN,2≥ ≥ˆ
p p pIN,1 IN,11 IN> = ˆ pˆ p pIN IN,22 IN,2= <
p p pIN,11 IN IN,22> >ˆ
p pIN IN= ˆ p p dIN IN- <ˆ
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new health-care interventions and it can be described
as follows. Assume ﬁrst that the planner does not
maintain a societal perspective and does not recognize
indirect costs. Its community therefore consists only of
patients. Let the direct costs per treatment of ij and ik
be denoted by  and , and let the QALYs per treat-
ment be denoted by qij and qik. Assume further that
 and qij > qik, because otherwise one treatment
dominates the other and it is never efﬁcient to provide
a dominated treatment to patients. Next, deﬁne the
incremental direct-cost-effectiveness (ICE) ratio on any
pair of treatments a and b, where and qa > qb,
as , and consider all such ICE ratios
in the health-care system in which treatment a is cur-
rently provided to or sanctioned for patients and b is
the next most costly, next most QALY-productive
treatment for the same illness. Let λD denote the largest
of all of these ICE ratios, and call λD the cutoff or
threshold point.
The decision rule in the one-illness, two-treatment
model then states that treatment ij is cost-effective,
meaning that one or more patients having i should be
assigned to it rather than to treatment ik, if and only if
the ICE ratio
(1)
Although the decision rule has been known for
some time (e.g., [26–29]), its application does not
necessarily give a cost- or resource-constrained system-
wide maximum of QALYs, and for that reason its use-
fulness as a planning tool and its place in CEA have
been disputed [30,31]. Nevertheless, it is readily dem-
onstrated that—at least when indirect costs are
ignored—the rule is a device for testing whether there
are social welfare advantages in assigning patients to
treatment ij rather than to treatment ik. An argument
to that effect is as follows.
First of all, if (1) holds there exists at least one pair
of treatments for another illness h, say ht(h) and hs(h)
such that
(2)
where ht(h) is the currently provided treatment for
patients having h, , qht(h) > qhs(h), and next
to ht(h), hs(h) is the most costly, most QALY-pro-
ductive treatment for h. Then assuming for simplic-
ity that the numbers of patients can be varied
continuously, it is always possible to switch one or
more patients ni(h) (≤Ni) having illness i from treat-
ment ik to treatment ij and simultaneously to switch
one or more patients nh (≤Nh) having illness h from
ht(h) to hs(h) so that
cijD cikD
c cij ikD D>
c c ca b b
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ij ik
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< l
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that is, so that the constancy of total direct costs is pre-
served. But because
(qij − qik)ni(h) > (qht(h) − qhs(h))nh and total QALYs
increase. Now sum over all such possible switches so
that , and the total change in QALYs is
when the change in the health care system’s total direct
costs is
That is, there always exists a reassignment of patients
from ik to ij and between pairs of treatments elsewhere
in the health-care system that increases total QALYs
but does not change total direct costs.
The reassignment therefore improves the (patient)
community’s health well-being; and because it does not
change total direct costs, it does not reduce the income
available to the community for expenditure on non-
health goods and services either. As a consequence, it
does not reduce the community’s current and future
consumption of nonhealth goods and services, so that
the improvement in health well-being either increases
the utility patients derive from this consumption or
else directly improves the community’s overall well-
being (shifts its social welfare function upward). In
either event, the reassignment unambiguously
improves the community’s social welfare and justiﬁes
the provision or sanctioning of treatment ij for
patients.
But suppose now that the planner maintains a soci-
etal perspective so that its community consists of the
entire population living in some speciﬁed geographic
or other area. Let the total cost of any treatment a be
denoted by ca, write , and let the cutoff
point λ be the largest ICE ratio of the form (ca − cb)/
(qa − qb) anywhere in the health-care system, where
ca > cb, qa > qb, treatment a is currently provided to or
sanctioned for patients, and next to treatment a treat-
ment b is the most costly, most QALY-productive treat-
ment for the given illness. Then for the planner having
a societal perspective treatment ij is cost-effective if
and only if
(2)
Reasoning similar to what has just been given can be
adduced to show that if (2) holds there exists a reas-
signment of patients such that one or more patients
can be assigned to ij and patients can be switched
c c n
q q n
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q q n
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between other pairs of treatments in a way that
increases total QALYs without increasing total costs.
Nevertheless, the welfare implications of this result are
no longer clear because nothing precludes the possibil-
ity that the reassignment increases total direct costs,
and, if it does, there can be no assurance that patients
can be reassigned in a way that improves the commu-
nity’s social welfare.
To see this is so consider a numerical example. Sup-
pose a planner cares for patients having only four ill-
nesses labeled 1–4, the QALY productivity and costs of
which are shown in Table 1. Patients having illness 1
are currently cared for by treatment 11, and treatment
12 is a new treatment for this illness. Patients having
illness 2 are currently cared for by treatment 22, and
treatment 21 is the next most QALY-productive, most
costly treatment for the illness. Similarly, patients hav-
ing illnesses 3 and 4 are currently cared for by treat-
ments 32 and 42, respectively, and treatments 31 and
41 are, respectively, the next most QALY-productive,
most costly treatments for these illnesses. The plan-
ner’s task is to decide whether treatment 12 is cost-
effective and whether therefore to provide or sanction
it for patients in place of treatment 11. The total-cost
and total-direct-cost ICE ratios calculated on the four
treatment pairs are shown in the rightmost two col-
umns of the table.
By inspection and in dollars per QALY, λ= 8750
and λD = 7400. Because (c12 − c11)/(q12 − q11) = 8400
< λ, treatment 12 is cost-effective by the decision rule
(2). Hence the planner will attempt to switch patients
having illness 1 from treatment 11 to treatment 12 and
to switch patients from more costly to less costly treat-
ments for other illnesses so as to increase total QALYs
without increasing total costs. In the example the only
possible such switch is between treatments 11 and 12
and treatments 22 and 21, because (c12 − c11)/(q12 −
 q11) is larger than both (c32 − c31)/(q32 − q31) and (c42 −
 c41)/(q42 − q41), and any switch of patients from 11 to
12 and from 32 to 31 or from 42 to 41 that preserves
the constancy of total costs reduces or does not change
total QALYs. (For a proof of the claim see Appendix.)
Accordingly, the planner can switch patients from
treatment 11 to treatment 12 and from treatment 22 to
treatment 21 in the ratio of 5 : 6, and each such switch
increases total QALYs by 0.01 without changing total
costs. If it is possible to perform the reassignment, the
community’s overall social welfare is therefore unam-
biguously improved. Nevertheless, every switch of ﬁve
patients  from  11  to  12  and  six  patients  from  22  to
21 also increases total direct costs by $490. Indeed,
because , any
switch of patients from treatment 11 to treatment 12
and from treatment 22 to treatment 21 that increases
total QALYs increases total direct costs. (A proof of
the assertion is given in the Appendix.) The issue then
is how the increase in total direct costs affects the plan-
ner’s ability  to  assign  patients  to  treatment  12  and
how it bears on the conclusion that treatment 12 is
cost-effective.
If the planner elects to pay the added direct cost by
increasing its income—by raising its insurance rates or
its treatment prices, by securing additional funding
from government, or in some other way—any such
action absorbs income or resources that the commu-
nity spends on current or future nonhealth consump-
tion and reduces the utility that the community derives
from that consumption. The reduction in utility is not
measurable or not measurable as QALYs or other
quantiﬁers of health beneﬁts, but it offsets in whole or
part of the gain in social welfare attributable to the
community’s improved health status, and the most
that can be concluded is that treatment ij is possibly
cost-effective. If the planner is inefﬁcient and operates
with idle resources or income, it can, of course, meet
part or all of the increase in its total direct costs by
employing those resources or spending its unused
income. But if that is true, a CEA is unnecessary to
justify providing or sanctioning ij for patients. The
planner need only provide or sanction the treatment
by employing its idle resources or spending its unused
income, and it is either unnecessary or not obviously
necessary to reassign patients to treatments for other
illnesses.
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Table 1 Hypothetical QALY productivity and costs of treatments for four illnesses and ICE ratios deﬁned on the treatments
Illness Treatment
QALYs
per
patient
Total cost
per patient
($)
Direct cost
per patient
($)
Indirect cost
per patient
($)
ICE ratios ($/QALY)
Total cost Direct cost
1 12 0.15 570 475 95 8400 7000
11 0.10 150 125 25
2 22 0.06 750 520 170 8750 6750
21 0.02 400 310 90
3 32 0.20 630 570 60 7600 7400
31 0.15 250 200 50
4 42 0.08 360 270 90 6250 4500
41 0.04 110 90 20
Currently provided treatments are underlined.
ICE, incremental direct-cost-effectiveness; QALY, quality-adjusted life-year.
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It is reasonable, however, to think that planners do
not usually maintain idle resources or income, that
they ordinarily spend up to their resource or budget
limits, and thus that they generally operate with bind-
ing constraints on their direct costs. But if the planner
in the example maintains a binding constraint on its
total direct costs, it cannot carry out the reassignment
of patients that increases total QALY output and pre-
serves the constancy of total costs without violating
that constraint. The gain in social welfare obtainable
by switching patients to the putatively cost-effective
treatment ij is therefore merely hypothetical, and the
treatment is not cost-effective regardless of the impli-
cation of (2).
Although it is unlikely, it is conceivable that a plan-
ner might spend less than the upper bound on its total
direct costs on account of regulatory restrictions. It is
hard to say what these restrictions might be, but if they
exist they force an even tighter constraint on total
direct costs than the constraint deﬁned by the planner’s
resource base or budget. Hence the planner is no more
able to afford the increase in total direct costs than it
would be if the constraint were imposed by its budget
or resource limits, and again treatment ij again is not
cost-effective. It is also unlikely but conceivable that
the planner operates with a constraint on its total indi-
rect costs, that this constraint is binding, and that the
constraint on its total direct costs is not binding
because any additional expenditure of direct costs to
produce or sanction more or more costly treatments
would increase total indirect costs and violate the con-
straint on those costs. In that case, the planner could
absorb the added direct cost of the patient reassign-
ment as long as the reassignment does not increase
total indirect costs. In the example, each 5:6 switch of
patients between treatments 11 and 12 and between
treatments 22 and 21 reduces total indirect costs by
$130. Thus in this one scenario, treatment 12 is cost-
effective—that is, it can be provided to patients and its
adoption increases the community’s social welfare—if
the planner initially maintains a binding constraint on
its total indirect costs and a nonbinding constraint on
its total direct costs. Unfortunately, to know that these
conditions are satisﬁed, the analyst must be familiar
with the planner’s managerial policies, and because
these policies are not necessarily uniform across plan-
ners, treatment 12 may be cost-effective in one health-
care system and not in another, even when treatment
costs and QALY productivity and the cutoff point λ
are the same in both systems.
None of this is to say that the cutoff-point decision
rule always or even regularly gives false or misleading
information when the planner’s perspective is societal.
It will be evident, for example, that with only a few
changes in the ﬁgures in Table 1, treatment 12
becomes cost-effective (or not) beyond argument. All
the same, whenever the planner holds a societal per-
spective, a new treatment is judged cost-effective by
the cutoff-point decision rule, and the required reas-
signment of patients among treatments required by the
cutoff-point methodology increases total direct costs.
It is hard to think of plausible scenarios in which the
planner can afford the added cost or, if it can, in which
its actions unequivocally increase its community’s
social welfare. And not only is the conclusion that a
new treatment is cost-effective not necessarily reliable;
but to assess the reliability of the conclusion, the ana-
lyst must be familiar with the planner’s cost structure
and management. Simple applications of the cutoff-
point rule are not sufﬁcient. (Notice that in the exam-
ple, treatment 12 is cost-effective by the rule even if the
planner does not take a societal perspective because
, and the result con-
tributes nothing to a resolution of the reliability prob-
lem.) This suggests that any ﬁnding that a new
treatment is cost-effective when a societal perspective
is assumed should be accompanied by the qualiﬁcation
that it is valid only if the planner can and does execute
the required reassignment of patients among treat-
ments without increasing its total direct costs.
Conclusion
The premise that adding indirect costs to direct costs
corrects or adjusts the outcomes of CEAs for the inci-
dental effects of formal health care on the community
at large is intuitively appealing, but it also introduces
complications into models of CEA. It can be incorpo-
rated in the many-illness, many-treatment model only
by imposing a constraint on the planner’s total indirect
costs, but this constraint cannot be speciﬁed arbitrarily
because if it is, it implies unrealistically that the plan-
ner must be indifferent between losses of QALYs and
reductions in total indirect costs. This article proposes
an adaptation of the model in which with some com-
putational effort the rational planner can obtain a
resource-constrained maximum of total QALY output
and at the same time realize a predetermined marginal
trade-off rate between QALYs and indirect costs.
Other methods of building welfare objectives into the
many-illness, many-treatment model may exist as well,
but without a constraint on total indirect costs, the
model lacks signiﬁcant welfare content.
Although cost constraints have no explicit role in
the standard one-illness, two-treatment model of CEA,
they cannot really be disregarded when the planner
elects to recognize indirect costs. If the planner sets a
constraint on its total indirect costs, it presumably
chooses the constraint so as to maintain a target mar-
ginal trade-off rate between QALYs and indirect costs.
Nevertheless, it is hard to see how such a marginal
trade-off rate can be built into the model. The most
obvious candidate, the largest ICE ratio of the form
—the largest marginal indirect cost
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of QALYs—in the health-care system, denote it by λIN,
plays no immediate part in the cutoff-point decision
rule,  and,  except  that  it  is  positive,  it  can  take  on
any value at all. In addition, the difference
 can have any algebraic sign
whether or not treatment 12 is cost-effective by the
cutoff-point rule (2). In view of these indeterminacies,
there can be no assurance that the rule gives a conclu-
sion consistent with the planner’s choice of a target
QALY-indirect cost trade-off rate by which it sets the
constraint on total indirect costs.
Whether or not they actually constrain their total
indirect costs, it is reasonable to think that all planners
tend to face constraints on their total direct costs,
either budget limits or the total costs of the limited
supplies of formal health-care resources that they com-
mand or direct. When these constraints are not binding
because  planners  are  able  to  meet  the  direct  costs
of assigning patients to new, putatively cost-effective
treatments by increasing their incomes, the welfare
implications of the cutoff-point methodology are
compromised. But when the constraints are binding,
assigning patients to a societally cost-effective treat-
ment can increase the health-care system’s total direct
costs, forcing a violation of the constraint and making
the treatment not cost-effective per se, and there seem
to be no ways of determining whether the constraint is
violated short of making a detailed investigation of the
planner’s behavior and the cost and QALY structure of
its health-care system. As a consequence, unless it can
be shown empirically that violations of the constraint
are so rare that they can be safely ignored, the relia-
bility of the cutoff-point decision rule cannot be taken
for granted whenever the planner is assumed to hold a
societal perspective.
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Appendix
Suppose ht(h) and hs(h) are treatments for illness h,
cht(h) > chs(h), and qht(h) > qht(h). If
(3)
and ni(h) patients are switched from ik to ij and nh,
patients  are  switched  from  ht(h)  to  hs(h)  so  that
(cij − cik)ni(h) = (cht(h) − chs(h))nh, then
whence (qij − qik)ni(h) ≤ (qht(h) − qhs(h))nh. If the switches
between treatments are such that (qij − qik)ni(h) >
(qht(h) − qhs(h))nh,
which implies (cij − cik)ni(h) > (cht(h) − chs(h))nh. In words,
if (3) holds any switch of patients between ik and ij
and between ht(h) and hs(h) that preserves the con-
stancy of total costs reduces or does not change total
QALYs, and any switch of patients that increases total
QALYs increases total costs. The results are obviously
also true if costs are deﬁned as direct costs.
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